

2026

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Security Needs Assessment & Crime Impact Statement

Ashley Park



Kabsec

Consultancy Ltd

Security Risk Management

BREEAM Hea 08 Security Needs Assessment & Crime Impact Statement

**Ashley Park – Former Ashley House, Ashley Road,
Tottenham Hale, London N17 9LZ**




Image Source DLA Architects

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28th August 2026

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Purpose of the report

This report defines a Security Needs Assessment (SNA) completed by KABSEC Consultancy in support of the proposed development, comprising a co-living building within the South Block, which includes two commercial units at ground floor level, a residential apartment block within the North Block, which includes a single commercial unit at ground floor level, together with associated amenity spaces, vehicle parking and landscaping at:

Ashley Park
Former Ashley House Site
Ashley Road
London
N17 9LZ

The **SNA** examines security threats to the planned development and identifies security vulnerabilities in the architectural designs and intended use. The SNA adheres to a security design methodology to provide security recommendations that should be incorporated into future project stages. These recommendations are specifically aimed at mitigating security risks to the development, its users, and the surrounding area.

The **CIS** aims to provide a comprehensive analysis based on current data, historical trends, and predictive modelling to identify potential risks and benefits associated with the development. Through this assessment, we seek to inform decision makers, community leaders, and the public about how the project may alter the landscape of community safety, contribute to or mitigate crime, and suggest strategies for effectively managing any impact. The goal is to ensure that the development not only advances economic growth but also enhances the well-being and security of Exeter residents.

The site-specific **SNA** and **CIS** includes the following:

1. A **visual audit** of the site and surroundings, identifying environmental cues and features pertinent to the security of the proposed development.
2. Details of the formal **consultation with relevant stakeholders**, including the Police Design Out Crime Officer (DOCO) or Counter-Terrorism Security Advisor (CTSA) in order to obtain

a summary of crime and disorder issues in the immediate vicinity of the proposed development.

3. **Identify risks** specific to both the building and the proposed, likely or potential user groups of the building and **propose recommendations for security improvements**.
4. Identify any **detrimental effect** the development may have on the existing community.

The purpose of the assessment is to inform stakeholder decision-making and allow the identification and evaluation of security recommendations and solutions.

The content of this report may be restricted.

This document should be dealt with in accordance with relevant disclosure requirements.

BREEAM Hea 08 Security - Requirements

“A Suitably Qualified Security Specialist (SQSS) conducts an evidence-based Security Needs Assessment (SNA) during or prior to Concept Design (RIBA Stage 2 or equivalent)”

BREEAM awards a point towards a development’s rating if an SNA is completed and recommendations from that assessment (this document) are implemented.

The aim of Hea 08 is to recognise and encourage effective measures to promote the **Security of Site and Buildings**.

A credit for this element is achieved where:

1. A Suitably Qualified Security Specialist (SQSS) conducts an evidence-based Security Needs Assessment (SNA) during or prior to Concept Design (RIBA Stage 2 or equivalent). The purpose of the SNA will be to identify attributes of the proposal, site and surroundings which may influence the approach to security for the development.
2. The SQSS develops a set of security controls and recommendations for incorporation into the proposals. Those controls and recommendations shall directly relate to the threats and assets identified in the preceding SNA.
3. The controls and recommendations shall be incorporated into proposals and implemented in the as-built development. Any deviation from those controls and recommendations shall be justified and agreed with the SQSS.

Kevin Burrows of KABSEC Consultancy acted as SQSS for this Security Needs Assessment.

Kevin is listed as SABRE accredited by BRE.

Kevin is listed as a fully licensed Secured by Design consultant, as shown at [SBD Consultant](#).

Initial assessment was completed:

Date: 28/8/26

RIBA Stage: 2

Site Location



Site Location - Google Maps

The proposal relates to the redevelopment of a currently vacant and cleared brownfield site at Ashley House, Ashley Road, Tottenham Hale (N17 9LZ), comprising the construction of a co-living building within the South Block, incorporating two commercial units at ground floor level, and a residential apartment building within the North Block, incorporating a single commercial unit at ground floor level, together with associated amenity space, landscaping, servicing, car and cycle parking provision, and ancillary facilities. The former buildings on the site have already been demolished, leaving a vacant site within an area undergoing significant regeneration and redevelopment. The site forms part of the wider Ashley Road growth area in Tottenham Hale, which has benefited from substantial investment in recent years, transforming former industrial and underutilised land into a mixed-use urban neighbourhood comprising residential, commercial, educational and community uses.

To the north, the character of the area is predominantly mixed-use, comprising modern residential-led developments, commercial premises and employment space associated with the wider Tottenham Hale regeneration programme. The area benefits from active pedestrian movement throughout the day, supported by nearby residential communities, workplaces and transport infrastructure.

To the south, land uses include a mix of residential developments, retail provision, community facilities and commercial accommodation centred around Ashley Road and the Tottenham Hale district centre. This area experiences regular footfall and vehicular activity associated with local services, public transport connections and the growing residential population.

To the east, the site is bordered by further mixed-use development, including residential apartment schemes, employment space and public realm improvements linking toward Tottenham Hale Station. The station and surrounding transport hub generate significant daily pedestrian movement, creating an active urban environment throughout both daytime and evening periods.

To the west, the area continues to comprise a blend of residential, educational and commercial uses. Public open spaces, pedestrian routes and cycle links contribute to increased activity and natural surveillance across the locality.

The site benefits from excellent transport connectivity. Tottenham Hale Station is located within short walking distance and provides London Underground (Victoria Line), National Rail and Stansted Express services, offering direct connections to Central London, Stratford, Cambridge and Stansted Airport. The surrounding road network includes the A1055 (Watermead Way) and A503, providing strategic vehicular links across North and East London. Numerous bus routes also serve the area, supporting convenient access for residents, staff, visitors and service providers. Collectively, these transport links contribute to a highly accessible and well-connected urban environment suitable for this development.

Section 2

Security Needs Assessment

Executive Summary

This report has been developed to support security planning for the proposed redevelopment of the site, comprising a co-living building within the South Unit, a residential apartment building within the North Building, three integral commercial spaces, associated amenity spaces, landscaping, servicing arrangements, and car and cycle parking provision.

A thorough evaluation focused on Ashley Road revealed crime rates and patterns which generally align with those observed in City districts. This analysis underscores the significance of tailored security strategies for the residential and commercial elements at this location, ensuring their safety and security in the context of the local crime environment.

The development will provide studio rooms and maisonettes with all necessary ancillary services, communal and amenity spaces, with dedicated bin and cycle storage spaces.

The proposals for the site would offer vastly improved passive surveillance opportunities to both neighbouring properties and the surrounding area. Development of the site into residential accommodation will undoubtedly increase footfall, thereby adding to passive surveillance potential and significantly improving on current observation levels.

This security needs assessment relates to commercial and residential elements and is a 'fully fitted' assessment in respect of these residential elements.

Features to improve security provision in the future are included and are shown as advisory comments within the assessment. Some physical protection elements and a level of access control are deemed essential within any category of fit-out and are indicated by a mandatory status.

BREEAM permits visual audits to be undertaken through a review of project information and drawings where the SQSS is satisfied that sufficient information is available to inform the Security Needs Assessment (SNA).

Having considered the scale, complexity, location and context of the development, the SQSS determined that a remote visual audit was appropriate. The site is currently a cleared brownfield plot at RIBA Stage 2, with sufficient information available through detailed design drawings, Google Street View imagery, and a review of the surrounding area and comparable developments. These sources provided an adequate basis to assess the site's security risks and develop proportionate security recommendations.

The audit did not identify any active/recent instances of current signal crimes (or disorders) in the immediate area of the site.

A lower crime risk designation has been confirmed with the MPS DOCO during initial discussions. The DOCO advises the architects have already been provided with comments on current design proposals.

Developed theory

The foremost theory used to reduce the likelihood of criminal activity within planning and construction disciplines is crime prevention through environmental design. (CPTED).

1. Physical protection This is the application of physical security measures to prevent or deter unauthorised access

2. Surveillance opportunity Ensuring there are multiple surveillance opportunities (natural, formal and informal) ensures the development is protected from casual intrusion and opportunist criminals.

3. Access Control Both natural and man-made access control measures can be applied in this context to create single, clearly identifiable points of entry to the site or site buildings.

4. Territoriality This can be the actual definition or subconscious assertion that the development belongs, although not formally, to a legitimate user group.

5. Maintenance Ensuring an area remains well-maintained in the future will reduce the likelihood of further ASB, loitering and criminality.

All five principles are considered within this assessment.

KABSEC Consultancy is a proponent of the ISO 22341 standard, a document that has essentially taken ageing CPTED principles and modernised/updated them to inform today's security needs. The KABSEC assessment is again cognisant of ISO 22341 concepts with relevant interventions included.

Physical protection elements are designed to achieve, as a minimum, the requirements of Secured by Design. The principles of the SABRE scheme are also considered, so where physical protection elements may be restricted, then adequate and appropriate mitigation is required to provide sufficient levels of protection.

BREEAM requirements necessitate liaison with the local Design Out Crime Officer (DOCO) and/or Counter Terrorism Security Advisor (CTSA) to quantify risk. **See page 16.**

Layering Security Measures

Perimeter Security: This is the outermost layer and involves measures to secure the physical boundaries of a facility. It can include features like fences, walls, gates, access control points, and barriers to prevent unauthorised entry.

Access Control: Access control is a critical layer that regulates who can enter and exit a facility. It includes measures like card readers, keypads, biometric scanners, and security personnel who monitor and control access to buildings or specific areas within a facility.

Security Surveillance: Security cameras and monitoring systems provide continuous surveillance, recording activities, and providing a deterrence factor. They can also be used for investigations in case of incidents.

Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS): IDS systems are designed to detect unauthorised entry or security breaches. They include sensors, alarms, and notifications to alert security personnel when there's a breach.

Security Lighting: Adequate lighting is essential for deterring criminals and enhancing visibility. Well-lit areas are less likely to be targeted for criminal activity.

Physical Barriers: These are additional layers within a facility, such as secure doors, reinforced windows, safes, and locks, designed to protect specific assets or areas.

Security Personnel: Trained security personnel, such as guards or receptionists, provide a human presence to monitor access, respond to incidents, and enforce security policies.

Security Policies and Procedures: Effective security also relies on well-defined policies and procedures that govern how security measures are implemented and enforced. This includes protocols for handling incidents, access control, and emergency response.

Emergency Preparedness: Having plans and resources in place for emergencies, such as fires, natural disasters, or security breaches, is crucial. This includes evacuation plans, fire suppression systems, and emergency communication systems.

Visitor Management: Properly managing and monitoring visitors to a facility is essential. This can include sign-in procedures, visitor badges, and escort requirements for visitors in secure areas.

Employee Training: Ensuring that employees are trained in security awareness and know how to follow security protocols is a fundamental layer of physical security.

Each of these layers contributes to the overall security of a facility, and organisations typically assess their specific needs and risks to determine which layers are most appropriate for their situation. The multi-layered approach to physical security is more effective than relying on a single security measure.

Crime Data

The primary source of information is the Police.uk website. The Police.uk data provides the only source of fully audited data for crime pattern analysis.

The Tottenham Hale policing area would be designated an **average** crime Borough in the Metropolitan Police area, and when compared to national averages, the site would fall into a medium crime category. The site is located within a key urban area.

Where additional but relevant neighbourhood data is required, then the Office for National Statistics (ONS) and affiliated websites are used. All sites are fully audited Government controlled open-source sites that allow members of the public and professionals alike to review recorded statistics in respect of chosen neighbourhoods. This becomes pertinent when crime concentrations are calculated, as the calculation involves both crimes count and the number of residences within the neighbourhood.

Websites referred to allow for a limited complexity of data trawls to be performed, but available data provides sufficient information to allow comparisons to be made against similar or adjacent areas.

For this site assessment, the postcode of **N17 9LZ** has been used as a centre point for the collation of crime datasets.

The result of our calculations is that the site is within the middle quartile of recorded crimes nationally.

The relevant data statistics are shown in **Appendices A & B**

Area Audit

The crime pattern analysis indicates that the main risks are:

Violence-related offences – Crime statistics indicate offending patterns are heavily weighted towards offences which include violence (or threat of). This again is down to location. Whilst crime patterns cannot be ascertained on a temporal basis, many of these offences will undoubtedly occur during the evening economy.

Anti-social behaviour - The online environmental visual audit reveals the site is bordered by residential, health facilities, university, leisure and commercial units. There are no signs of signal crimes or signal disorders which would indicate rapid repair/removal as and when offences occur.

Theft from the person - refers to stealing property from someone while it's being held or carried by the victim, without the use of force or threats. This includes pickpocketing and handbag snatching, but not if the theft involves violence or the threat of violence, which would be classified as robbery. This crime trend is likely to affect persons walking to/from the site.

Another important element for BREEAM accreditation is what effect the proposed development could have on the surrounding area, and how existing properties will interface with the development. The proposed redevelopment of the site will undoubtedly improve passive surveillance within the immediate area; a proven positive when considering resistance to crime.

The intended use provides legitimate visitors over an extended period of the day – another positive when considering potential challenges to offenders.

In conclusion, this development is considered to enhance the area, and the proposed uses integrate successfully into both its immediate and wider surroundings without conflict.

The proposal will not adversely affect this community.

It is highly likely that these changes will enhance the community in which it is situated. This element of the BREEAM accreditation process can therefore be discharged, with the proposed enhancement of the area together without negatively effect on surrounding properties nor being negatively affected by neighbouring properties

Site Audit

“A visual audit of the site and surroundings, identifying environmental cues and features pertinent to the security of the proposed development”

This report aims to identify both actual and potential vulnerabilities, to futureproof against the more likely future crime trends. All proposals are made to provide long-term cost benefits to both landlord and/or tenants from physical protection elements.

The scope of this security needs assessment is ‘fully fitted’ in respect of the residential studios.

The proposed development of this site assimilates its surroundings and proposals for the site offer no detrimental effect on neighbouring properties. The proposed changes seek to deliver a more active, vibrant setting across ground-floor front elevations. Neighbouring properties, which include similar premises, will have no negative effect on this site.

The development of the site is viewed as a positive when assessing risk – security standards have improved, building methods are now far more resilient and updated aesthetics have been (academically) shown to impact the subconscious.

Risk to residents and staff would be designated **low**.

Risk to staff and residents would be increased to **medium** when on their approach to the site (although this would be dependent on the time of day the time of arrival or departure).

These risks form the basis for design threats as detailed on **Page 18**.

Consultation with relevant stakeholders

“Formal consultation with relevant stakeholders, including the local DOCO & CTSA (as applicable), in order to obtain a summary of crime and disorder issues in the immediate vicinity of the proposed development”

The Metropolitan Police DOCO was contacted on 16th July 2026, requesting for the DOCO to engage. The below response was received on 7th August 2026.

RE: BREEAM Assessment - Ashley House, Ashley Road, London N17 9LZ [Summarise this email](#)

Lee.J.Warwick@met.police.uk
To: Rebecca Lilley

You replied on Fri 07/08/2026 10:44

View conversation

Start reply with: [I understand. Thank you.](#) [Thank you very much for your response.](#) [Ok, thank you.](#)

Good morning Rebecca

Apologies for the late reply

A present we don't have the capacity to provide information for BREEAM assessments.

We are however in communication with the architects and have provided them with guidance and concerns regarding the development which you can discuss with them

Regards

Lee

On 17th July 2026, Kabsec attended a site briefing meeting with the project team to discuss the proposed development and review the submitted plans. Following the meeting, the project team provided a brief email summarising the discussions and key points raised. As follows:

Charles Jabre
To: Carey Gorgees
Cc: Meribel Lennon

Tue 25/08/2026 12:41

Meeting 17/07/2026 with Kabsec:

A briefing session was held with DLA and Kabsec to provide an overview of the proposed scheme on Ashley Park site. A high level overview was also given on the Cannon Factory site, but DLA noted that the scheme is still at very early stages and still subject to design development.

DLA noted that the proposal had been already presented to the Secure By Design officer and amendments have been incorporated to address comments and concerns previously raised by the officer.

The main queries raised by Kabsec were as follows:

- Replace revolving door to the shared living block to a PAS 24 door.
- Provide necessary CCTV, signage, adequate lighting, etc.
- Activation of undercroft space.
- Explore using Anti-graffiti surface / finish.
- Provide 2m high gates/fence for the shared living south courtyard.

Charles Jabre BArch MArch MSc
Associate Director

General risks for site and user groups

Site user groups will primarily comprise residents, commercial occupiers, visitors, servicing and delivery personnel, facilities management staff, and maintenance contractors. The inclusion of ground-floor commercial units and publicly accessible areas creates an implied invitation for members of the public to access parts of the development.

Crime statistics indicate the proposed development location is in a **medium** crime area.

Site-specific risks

- Theft or burglary (including pedal cycle)
- Criminal damage, or arson, against buildings.
- Disruptive trespass and Antisocial Behaviour.

Identified Design Threats (combined risk, site and surrounds).

Attack Category	Description
Opportunistic Theft: Non-Forceful Entry Without Violence	One threat actor endeavours to achieve unauthorised access to the building without resorting to force or violence. The intruder will refrain from carrying conspicuous tools or employing noisy techniques, This would include the higher crime category of pedal cycle theft.
Targeted Theft: Skilled Intrusion Involving the Use of Tools and/or Violence.	Two or more proficient intruders, armed with covert hand tools, are attempting to gain entry into the building. These attackers are willing to generate noise if required, for instance, by forcibly entering through a rear door to access the building. This is likely to be on the commercial element of the building.
Anti-Social or Public Order Acts (including criminal damage). Remaining external to premises or legitimate access whereupon offender(s) engage in disruptive actions/threats.	Single or multiple offenders. Generally, by way of protest or disagreement, shouting obscenities, verbal threats etc. Normally external to premises but may spill into the Reception/Commercial areas on site.

Recommendations for security improvements

The following security recommendations are based on all available information. The proposed development will undoubtedly provide increased levels of legitimate footfall across an extended period of hours. The proposed use provides a coherent, and continuous use of the space despite significant change to the site function, not impacting on either visitors or nearby business. The site is situated in a dynamic area, with activity both during the day and at night.

Given an 'average' crime designation at this location, the requirements listed are deemed commensurate to risk and incorporation within the build schedule shall achieve the BREEAM security requirements.

The development at Ashley House, Ashley Road, London comprises a co-living development within the South Block, incorporating two ground-floor commercial units, and a residential apartment building within the North Block, incorporating a single ground-floor commercial unit, together with associated amenity spaces, landscaping, servicing arrangements, and car and cycle parking. Whilst the site is assessed as presenting a medium level of crime risk, it remains important that appropriate and proportionate security measures are incorporated into the design and management of the development to minimise opportunities for crime and anti-social behaviour.

As such, mandatory elements of the security need are **emphasised**.

The below requirements are generic – if the below can be agreed to be included within any future build specification, then compliance shall be achieved under BREEAM pre-construction guidance.

The below requirements will also help to satisfy the Secured by Design security strategy imposed as a condition by the planning approval.

i) External Doors

Any final entry/exit door which provides access into or out of each building must comply with either:-

- Loss Prevention Standard 1175 Security Rating 2 (LPS1175 SR2 {B3})
- Security Technical Standard 202 Burglary Rating 2 (STS 202 BR2)
- BS PAS 24:2022

MANDATORY REQUIREMENT – this is inclusive of externally facing louvre doors.

ii) Internal Doors

Each residential apartment / room entrance doors should achieve PAS 24 certification, in addition to complying with all applicable fire safety regulations and performance requirements.

Alternatively, where apartments are arranged in clusters of up to five units, only the shared entrance door serving the cluster is required to achieve PAS 24 certification. In such arrangements, the individual apartment or studio entrance doors would not normally be required to meet the PAS 24 standard.

A number of manufacturers are able to provide doorsets that are dual certified for both PAS 24 security performance and the relevant fire-resistance standards.

MANDATORY REQUIREMENT

Any door which can be reached via publicly accessible spaces (cores, communal shared areas etc.) which protects any service (electricity, gas etc.) must be permanently locked and access controlled for designated staff only.

MANDATORY REQUIREMENT

Any door which can be reached via publicly accessible spaces (communal shared areas such as hallways etc.) must comply with either: -

- Loss Prevention Standard 1175 Security Rating 2 (LPS1175 SR2 {B3})
- Security Technical Standard 202 Burglary Rating 2 (STS 202 BR2)
- LPS 2081 Security Rating B (LPS 2081 SR B)
- PAS 24:2022

This is inclusive of any proposed mail rooms doors, and similar storage areas (bike, storage units etc).

MANDATORY REQUIREMENT

Communal doors in publicly accessible spaces would benefit from video surveillance coverage.

ADVISORY REQUIREMENT

iii) Windows

Any openable window forming part of the commercial shell must, as a minimum requirement comply with the PAS24 specification. This relates to any window less than 3.5m from ground level.

This requirement would also apply to any subterranean or upper-floor window (any window above 3.5m) if deemed 'easily accessible'. (Where the basis of 'easily accessible' is defined in Approved Document Q of Building Regulations).

MANDATORY REQUIREMENT

iv) Glazing units

Glazing units at ground and 1st floor to contain one piece of glass which meets the BS EN 356 P1A standard.

MANDATORY REQUIREMENT

v) Access Control and Core Protection

The access control system/s is yet to be finalised. The requirement for any system would be that it is designed and installed by a member of either the NSI or SSAIB accreditation schemes (see relevant information within the electronic security section below).

Effective access control is seen as essential to the success (or otherwise) of this development.

Due to the nature of the development, it will be necessary to accommodate multiple tenants who need access to the building and site at various hours, including day and night. As a result, implementing compartmentalisation on a floor-by-floor or cluster by cluster basis is crucial for efficient management and security.

Movement core design and locations readily allow for such - Provide access control to any proposed office spaces.

The UL293 standard would normally be required but given there are only a limited number of companies currently providing a product that achieves this specification, we would accept an access control system that is compliant with BS EN 50133 security classification 2A (now archived). Furthermore, the installation should be compliant with the requirements of BS EN 60839.

NB. The use of an NSI/SSAIB accredited company allows the discharge of these requirements should core protection be added to the BREEAM accreditation process.

(This would have to be subject to the future approval by the SQSS of any proposed system – the 2A classification requires the system to include destination control provision throughout, together with data logging facilities).

MANDATORY – if fully fitted / ADVISORY – if fitted to Category A standard

Access control is required for vulnerable areas where assets are stored such as server rooms, any potential mail rooms and cycle stores.

MANDATORY REQUIREMENT

Where gated areas are provided on the site, pedestrian access gates should be protected by an access control system to deter casual trespass. The access control system may be either electronic or manually operated.

ADVISORY REQUIREMENT

vi) Refuse/Bin Storage

Four designated refuse/bin stores are proposed as part of the development. Two serving the north block, and two servicing the south block. All refuse/bin stores are located at ground floor level and are accessed directly from the external environment.

The refuse/bin stores access points should be fully access-controlled. It should also include a means of escape on the inner face – if electrically operated, an exit button is required. If manually operated, a thumb turn or similar on the internal face would suffice. This is to prevent any user from becoming accidentally trapped.

MANDATORY REQUIREMENT

All refuse/bin stores require illumination.

Two stage lighting is preferred, where low levels of illumination are increased upon detection of motion. Suitable levels of illumination would be 5 Lux constant and 30 Lux minimum on motion sensing.

A vision panel in the access door into the residential store would be seen as good practice.

ADVISORY REQUIREMENT

vii) Cycle Storage

Five separate cycle storage areas are provided at ground floor level, two in the north block, and three in the south block. Three stores are accessed only directly from the external environment, while the remaining two stores benefits from both internal and external access.

Entrances into all internal the cycle stores require access control via key/fob/phone app etc. (to tie in with the access control system installed across the site)

Proposed cycle racking must comply with either Sold Secure Silver accreditation (3 points of locking from a company who is registered with SBD).

MANDATORY REQUIREMENT

The plans illustrate do not illustrate any external cycle storage areas external to the fabric of the building. For any proposed external cycle storage areas, Sheffield stands with the strengthening cross strut (tapping rail) should be installed. It provides a third independent point of locking and is far more resistant to vehicle contact.



MANDATORY REQUIREMENT

Cycle stores should have video surveillance. Cameras at entry/exit points are necessary.

The stores require to be illuminated when motion is sensed – 2-stage lighting is preferred, where a low-level ambient light is continuous and illumination levels are increased upon motion detection. Suggested levels 5 Lux/30 Lux.

ADVISORY REQUIREMENT

Many sites are now being required to provide electric cycle charging facilities. From both fire safety and security aspects, this type of store should be totally separated from the proposed cycle store. This can impact upon security need.

It is essential that any proposed cycle store with charging facilities are discussed with Fire Engineers as recent events have highlighted potential elements of poor design when considering all risks and the risk from overheating of Lithium Ion E cells.

ADVISORY REQUIREMENT

viii) Emergency Egress Doors

These can be manually or electrically operated. Any manual panic bar must meet either BS EN 179 or BS EN 1125. Any electrically operated door is to comply with BS EN 13637.

Any electromechanical holding mechanism of any egress door is to withstand a minimum of 600 Kg (6kN) of pull resistance prior to failure.

Additionally, final entry doors which are electrically controlled should remain secure in the event of power failure. To this end, any final entry/exit door which has no manual locking facility is to be connected to a uninterruptible power supply (UPS) so the site remains secure in the event of power disruption. We recommend a minimum of 18 hours UPS protection.

MANDATORY REQUIREMENT

Video images of emergency egress doors (internally or externally) would be seen as good practice

ADVISORY REQUIREMENT

ix) Lighting

It is important to develop a new lighting scheme tailored to the site need. This will be essential for ensuring the area is adequately illuminated for both development and future use.

From the Local Authority perspective, highways or public amenity areas must comply with BS 5489:2020. Areas within the curtilage must achieve (or exceed) either ILP or CIBSE minimum requirements. In addition, a 25% uniformity should also be specified.

Guidance in respect of lighting, internal or external, should be obtained from either ILP or CIBSE documentation.

Any lighting review should ensure that it complements any existing or proposed new CCTV system.

MANDATORY REQUIREMENT

It is recommended any area adjacent to public realm are designed to achieve BS5489 standards, with a gradual reduction in illumination levels into the site.

ADVISORY REQUIREMENT

x) Vehicle Parking Provision

Plans illustrate ten disabled parking bays located within a courtyard area between the north and south blocks. As this represents the only on-site vehicle parking provision, it is

important that an effective parking management strategy is implemented to minimise the potential for trespass, unauthorised parking and vehicle-related crime.

Whilst physical access controls are not proposed in order to maintain accessibility, the parking area should be designed and managed to promote a clear sense of ownership and exclusivity for legitimate users. This can be achieved by the following:

- The disabled bays should be clearly marked and supported by appropriate signage to reinforce their intended use and discourage unauthorised occupation.
- The courtyard should benefit from strong levels of natural surveillance from the surrounding residential accommodation, with clear sightlines maintained across the parking area to ensure activity can be readily observed.
- Lighting should be designed in accordance with current ILP and CIBSE guidance to provide a safe and legible environment during hours of darkness, supporting natural surveillance and reducing opportunities for concealment.
- Landscaping and boundary treatments should assist in defining the parking area without restricting visibility or creating hiding places.
- Clear management arrangements should be established to address unauthorised parking, misuse of disabled bays, abandoned vehicles and maintenance issues.

Collectively, these measures will help create a well-managed and actively overlooked parking environment that remains accessible whilst reducing opportunities for trespass and reinforcing that the parking provision is intended solely for residents and authorised users.

MANDATORY REQUIREMENT

Principles of the Safer Parking scheme (formerly 'Parkmark') should be used to inform design (the Safer Parking scheme requires marked bays, safe pedestrian routes etc.)

ADVISORY REQUIREMENT

xi) Vehicle Bollards

There are a number of locations across the site where pedestrians and vehicles are expected to interact, including building entrances, exits and principal pedestrian routes. These areas may be vulnerable to accidental vehicle encroachment and should therefore be assessed to determine whether appropriate protective measures are required.

The provision of vehicle bollards is recommended at locations where there is limited separation between vehicle routes and pedestrian areas, particularly around building entrances and along key pedestrian desire lines. Where installed, bollards should be positioned in accordance with the manufacturer's specifications and designed to maintain accessibility for all users. The clear distance between bollards should not exceed a 1.2m air gap, allowing wheelchair users and those with mobility aids to pass through safely whilst discouraging vehicle access into pedestrian areas.

The requirement for bollards should be considered on a location-by-location basis, taking account of existing levels, landscaping, stand-off distances and other physical features that may already provide a degree of separation between vehicles and pedestrians. The aim should be to deliver a proportionate level of protection whilst maintaining an accessible and attractive public realm, avoiding unnecessary street clutter where alternative design measures are sufficient to mitigate the risk of accidental vehicle incursion.

ADVISORY REQUIREMENT

xii) Boundary

The plans provided do not illustrate a physical secure perimeter to the building, although the site is likely to have an informal boundary, largely defined by suitable delineation informing where public and private areas are within the site.

Ensure a boundary is defined, by the means of a change of texture, colour or lining on roads/pathways. Also, introduce rule setting by means of signage within private only areas across the site.

MANDATORY REQUIREMENT

xiii) Landscaping

Landscaping is to be used as a method of demarcation between publicly accessible areas and areas deemed private. The design currently includes methods of delineation as previously mentioned, using rows of pavements, change of colour/texture etc.

As a general rule, in respect of security, trees should be of a species which allow for a minimum of two meters, clear stem, crown lift when mature.

Ground covering shrubbery should be maintained to a maximum height of 1 meter high, to ensure a 1 meter 'window of surveillance' is maintained.

MANDATORY REQUIREMENT

xiv) Manual security

Should an access control system be installed as part of the initial fit-out, a hold-up (panic) button could be installed for protection of staff and residents.

The building pedestrian entrances and exits would benefit from electronic surveillance (CCTV). A camera which provides identification standard images should be positioned to record visitors within retail areas.

MANDATORY REQUIREMENT

Should an access control system be installed as part of the initial fit-out, then a hold-up (panic) button could be installed within the reception area for the protection of staff, and residents.

MANDATORY REQUIREMENT

The plans do not illustrate a planned reception. Should a reception be part of the development, the aim would be to form the basis of post and parcel receiving. A dedicated parcel room, which is accessible only to staff, should be allocated as close to the reception area as is possible.

ADVISORY REQUIREMENT

The building pedestrian entrances and exits would benefit from electronic surveillance (CCTV).

Should a reception area be introduced, it would also benefit from electronic surveillance (CCTV). A camera which provides identification standard images should be positioned to protect Reception staff and record visitors in this area.

ADVISORY REQUIREMENT

xv) Electronic Security

Any electronic security system must be installed by a contractor that is registered under either the NSI or SSAIB accreditation schemes.

www.nsi.org.uk

www.ssaib.org.uk

If there is an existing system or where a new CCTV system is to be installed as part of any shell or core fit and is a standalone system, the requirements for this system would be that:

- Devices are securely stored in a landlord only portion of the building.
- The recording device has a means of export.
- Exports have operating software automatically burnt onto the disc or stick.
- Cameras will be of 16CIF quality.
- Complies with a minimum of BS62676 at Grade 2.
- Is registered with the Information Commissioners office if required (www.ico.gov.uk) to check. Your accredited installer will advise.

If primary images are to be stored on-site, it is recommended a 28-day retention period be designed in. Should primary storage of images be off-site, then a 7-day secondary (on-site) retention period would be acceptable.

MANDATORY – if a video surveillance system is installed.

xvi) Intruder Alarm

If any section of the building is to have an intruder alarm installed (landlord only spaces etc.), then the system should comply with the requirements of BS EN50131 at a minimum of a Grade 2 system. This again requires the use of an NSI/SSAIB registered company.

ADVISORY REQUIREMENT

xvii) Amenity Sources and Access

If the site features external gas and electricity meter boxes, they should have protection against vandalism and tampering.

Consideration should be given to installing LPS 1175 rated products such as cages and enclosures to provide anti-tampering protection to any proposed external gas and electricity meter boxes.

ADVISORY REQUIREMENT

xviii) Building Fabric

The North Block incorporates an undercroft area, which has been specified by the Local Planning Authority to facilitate ease of movement and access for residents and neighbouring occupiers. Whilst this arrangement provides connectivity and permeability, undercroft areas are recognised as having the potential to attract anti-social behaviour and criminal activity if not effectively managed and maintained.

Appropriate mitigation measures should therefore be incorporated, including a lighting scheme designed in accordance with BS 5489 where applicable and relevant Secured by Design guidance to ensure consistent levels of illumination and good facial recognition. ILP or CIBSE guidance should be followed where the British Standard is not applicable.

MANDATORY REQUIREMENT

A robust maintenance regime should also be implemented to ensure the area remains clean, well-presented and free from opportunities for misuse. It is further recommended that management staff undertake regular inspections of the area and promptly address

any identified issues, damage or inappropriate activity to maintain a safe and secure environment.

ADVISORY REQUIREMENT

The design of the building examined under this assessment shows regard for both the safety of person and the security of property.

Given all the above mandatory elements are included, I confirm that security credits available under the BREEAM scheme could be claimed.

This report has been produced based on all information collated and by way of subsequent correspondence. Should any amendment to the design or build specification be necessary, an SQSS should be notified in order that the security assessment can be modified as required.

Other considerations

Counter Terrorism

At the time of issue, the threat level for international terrorism in the UK set by the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) was set at **SUBSTANTIAL** <https://www.mi5.gov.uk/threat-levels>, meaning an attack is highly likely.

The terrorism threat posed to the development is deemed **low/medium** as it could be deemed a crowded place. More realistic targets are within the vicinity and this development if damaged, is likely to suffer the effects of a secondary nature.

INFORMATION ONLY


This report has been produced based on all information collated, including but not restricted to, site drawings, plans and associated documents, site visit, environmental visual audit and by way of subsequent correspondence. Should any amendment to the design or build specification be necessary, an SQSS should be notified in order that this security assessment can be modified as required.



KABSEC Consultancy.

Appendix A – Crime Data.


Tottenham Hale – Metropolitan Police



(Source: Police.uk)

Crime types description

for the last 12 months (from Jun 2025 to May 2026)




Crime levels overview

for the last 12 months (from Jun 2025 to May 2026)

Last 12 months


Last 3 years

Crime per Month



Type	Total	Percentage
Anti-social behaviour	409	1.9%
Bicycle theft	14	0.7%
Burglary	84	3.9%
Drugs	110	5.1%
Other theft	146	6.8%
Possession of weapons	19	0.9%
Public order	124	5.8%
Robbery	105	4.9%
Shoplifting	124	5.8%
Theft from the person	205	9.5%
Vehicle crime	147	6.8%
Violence and sexual offences	552	25.7%
Other crime	19	0.9%
Criminal damage and arson	94	4.4%

Appendix B – Condensed Area Data



- 22 Violence and Sexual Offences
- 18 All Other Crime
- 9 Anti-Social Behaviour
- 8 Theft from Person
- 4 Vehicle Crime
- 3 Drugs
- 2 Robbery
- 1 Burglary
- 1 Other Theft

The crime count in the immediate vicinity of the site allows neighbourhood datasets to be used as the basis for crime risk designation. It is apparent the site is within an 'average' crime area for an urbanised area, but there is always potential for crime to increase due to location and with consideration to wider neighbourhood crime patterns.

Appendix C - Useful Standards

Alarms

BS EN 50131 - 4 grades (to accommodate all EU requirements)

- | | |
|---|--|
| 1. Low Risk Site | (no response achievable – of little value in UK) |
| 2. Standard Domestic/Low Risk Commercial | (e.g. Florist/Newsagent) |
| 3. High Risk Domestic/Standard Commercial | (e.g. IT company/Financial Institution) |
| 4. High Risk Commercial | (e.g. Jewellers) |

BS 6799 - wire free systems

Don't forget the NSI and SSAIB accreditation schemes

www.nsi.org.uk

www.ssaib.org.uk

Both provide postcode search facility for specific localities.

Buildings

Loss Prevention Standard 1175 (LPS 1175 – 8 security ratings)

Intruder Resistance, strong rooms, security grilles, shutters etc.

The security rating system is loosely based upon: -

- | | |
|--|---|
| Domestic risk 1 and 2 | (where 1 is low and 2 is high risk) |
| Commercial risk 2, 3 and 4 | (2, Florist, 3, School, Designer outlet, 4 Chemist) |
| Higher security risks 5 and 6 | (High value Jewellers, Banks, Post Offices) |
| Extremely high security facilities 7 and 8 | (Bullion sites etc.) |

CCTV

(NSI and SSAIB accreditation is also applicable for CCTV)

- | | |
|----------|--|
| BS 7958 | Code of Practice |
| BS 8495 | Export of Digital Images |
| BS 8418 | Remote Monitoring Stations |
| BS 62676 | CCTV/Video Surveillance in security applications |

Doors

PAS24:2022 Residential.
LPS2081

LPS1175 Commercial
STS 202

Fencing

BS1722
Part 1 Chain Link
Part 2 Wire Mesh
Part 10 Anti intruder fences
Part 12 Steel Palisade

LPS 1175

Garage

LPS 1175 SR 1-2

Lighting

BS5489:2020 Public Amenity Areas.

Other Areas <https://theilp.org.uk/publication/lighting-against-crime/>

Guidance from either the Institute of Lighting Professionals (ILP) or the Chartered Institution of Building Services Engineers (CIBSE) are regularly used for lighting schemes. Subject to illumination and uniformity levels complying with any SQSS minimum requirement, then use of ILP or CIBSE levels are deemed satisfactory for average crime and below-average crime locations.

Locks

Standard	Function	Comments
BS 3621:2007 (key egress)	Locked by key from both sides	Provided that the key is removed, this type of lock is secure against operation by intruders reaching through a letter-plate, breaking nearby glazing etc. Best used where emergency escape is not required or where other means of escape exist and where security is paramount.
BS 8621:2007 (keyless egress)	Locked by key from outside only; can always be opened from the inside without a key – e.g. via a thumb turn or lever.	This type of lock offers emergency escape without a key at all times. Best used where there is no danger of the inside handle or thumb-turn being operated from the outside by, for instance, breaking a glazed panel, reaching through a letter plate etc. and where safety is critical (e.g. in flats)
BS 10621:2007 (dual mode)	Locked by key from outside only; can be opened from inside without a key EXCEPT when this function has been disabled by a positive key operation from the outside.	Combines ease of escape in emergency with an additional security feature for use ONLY when leaving the premises unoccupied. Best used where an alternative means of escape exists. BS 10621 offers: ● security <i>and</i> safety ● protection of properties when vacant

Euro Cylinders

TS 007 3 Star or
SS 312 Diamond Grade

Padlocks

EN12320 Standard Padlock Grades 1-6

Regular to extra high security including closed shackle.

Windows

PAS24:2022 Windows of enhanced security

STS 204

Windows must also comply with: -

BS 4873	Aluminium performance standard
BS 7412	PVCu performance standard
BS 644	Timber performance standard
BS 6510	Steel performance standard
BS 8213	Code of Practice re-install of PVCu windows

Glass and glazing (general attack resistance requirements)

BS EN 356(2000) Anti-bandit security glazing.

Domestic	BS EN 356 P1A
Commercial	BS EN 356 P1A
LPS 1270	Security Glazing & Glazing Films
BS 6206	Toughened Glass
BS EN 12150	Toughened Glass
BS EN 14179	Heat-soaked toughened glass
BS EN 14449	Laminated glass
BS EN 12543	Laminated glass

**This standards section may not incorporate all standards specified.*

It is intended to be used purely as an aide memoire – specific standards are included within the main body of the assessment security recommendation section (within the building security requirement section above).

Appendix D

Site Information - Drawings

 AHCF-BOSK-ZZ-00-DR-L-1000-P12	 AHCF-DLA-ZZ-16-DR-A-20216-LEVEL 16 PLAN
 AHCF-BOSK-ZZ-RF-DR-L-1000-P06	 AHCF-DLA-ZZ-17-DR-A-20217-LEVEL 17 PLAN
 AHCF-DLA-ZZ-00-DR-A-20200-GROUND FLOOR PLAN	 AHCF-DLA-ZZ-18-DR-A-20218-LEVEL 18 PLAN
 AHCF-DLA-ZZ-01-DR-A-20201-LEVEL 01 PLAN	 AHCF-DLA-ZZ-19-DR-A-20219-LEVEL 19 PLAN
 AHCF-DLA-ZZ-02-DR-A-20202-LEVEL 02 PLAN	 AHCF-DLA-ZZ-20-DR-A-20220-LEVEL 20 PLAN
 AHCF-DLA-ZZ-03-DR-A-20203-LEVEL 03 PLAN	 AHCF-DLA-ZZ-21-DR-A-20221-LEVEL 21 PLAN
 AHCF-DLA-ZZ-04-DR-A-20204-LEVEL 04 PLAN	 AHCF-DLA-ZZ-22-DR-A-20222-LEVEL 22 PLAN
 AHCF-DLA-ZZ-05-DR-A-20205-LEVEL 05 PLAN	 AHCF-DLA-ZZ-RF-DR-A-20230-ROOF PLAN
 AHCF-DLA-ZZ-06-DR-A-20206-LEVEL 06 PLAN	
 AHCF-DLA-ZZ-07-DR-A-20207-LEVEL 07 PLAN	
 AHCF-DLA-ZZ-08-DR-A-20208-LEVEL 08 PLAN	
 AHCF-DLA-ZZ-09-DR-A-20209-LEVEL 09 PLAN	
 AHCF-DLA-ZZ-10-DR-A-20210-LEVEL 10 PLAN	
 AHCF-DLA-ZZ-11-DR-A-20211-LEVEL 11 PLAN	
 AHCF-DLA-ZZ-12-DR-A-20212-LEVEL 12 PLAN	
 AHCF-DLA-ZZ-13-DR-A-20213-LEVEL 13 PLAN	
 AHCF-DLA-ZZ-14-DR-A-20214-LEVEL 14 PLAN	
 AHCF-DLA-ZZ-15-DR-A-20215-LEVEL 15 PLAN	

Ground Floor Plan



Image Source: dla Architects

First Floor Plan



Image Source: dla Architects

Site Survey (Image Source: Google Maps)



1.




2.



3.



4.




5.



6.



7.



Appendix E

SQSS Credentials

Suitably Qualified Security Specialist

An individual achieving 1–3 or all of the following can be considered to be suitably qualified for the purposes of compliance with BREEAM:

- 1. Minimum of three years' experience in a relevant security profession (in the last five years). This experience must clearly demonstrate a practical understanding of factors affecting security in relation to construction and the built environment, relevant to the type and scale of the project being undertaken.*
- 2. Holds a qualification relevant to security.*
- 3. Maintains a full membership to a relevant professional body, institute or certification scheme that has a professional code of conduct, to which members adhere.*
- 4. A specialist registered with a BREEAM-recognised third-party licensing or registration scheme for security specialists.*

An SQSS may be any practising security professional (e.g. a private security consultant or advisor, a Police DOCO, CTSA, or an individual associated with the client team), however, they must demonstrate that they hold the experience, qualifications and memberships required by the SQSS criteria.

When appointing the SQSS, consideration should be given to the appropriateness of the individual to carry out the task assigned. The SQSS should be able to demonstrate that they have experience dealing with similar projects with equal security levels and similar risk.

SQSS Credentials for Kevin Burrows, KABSEC Consultancy are below:



The Consultant has held a full licence for 10 years



The SQSS is a full member of the Security Institute



ProQual Level 5 Diploma in Crime Prevention - Designing Out Crime

has been awarded to

Kevin Burrows

31 / 10 / 2019

An award of ProQual AB Ltd, accredited by Ofqual
603/1158/6
European Qualifications Framework Level 5
Certificate number 167684

Pam Lewis
Director of Qualifications
ProQual AB Ltd




ProQual AB Ltd, Company Registration Number: 07464445

The SQSS is a Level 5 complaint as required in BREEAM educational standards.



The SQSS has been a full member for 9 years.



The SQSS is registered as a SABRE assessor