

Executive Summary

Site Location and Description

The site is located in Crouch End, within the London Borough of Haringey. The site is occupied by a five-storey semi-detached YMCA hostel property fronting Tottenham Lane. The site is bound to the north-east by Elmfield Avenue, to the south-east by the A103 Tottenham Lane, to the south-west by Rosebery Gardens, and to the west by residential properties.

Proposed Works

The nature and extent of works proposed was not available at the time of writing.

Geology and Bomb Penetration Depth

The British Geological Survey (BGS) map shows the bedrock geology of the site to be underlain by the London Clay Formation – clay, silt and sand. Sedimentary bedrock formed between 56 and 47.8 million years ago during the Palaeogene period.

Site-specific geotechnical information was not available to 1st Line Defence at the time of the production of this report. An assessment of maximum bomb penetration depth can be made once such data becomes available, or by a UXO specialist during on-site support.

It should be noted that the maximum depth that a bomb could reach may vary across a site and will be largely dependent on the specific underlying geological strata and its density.

UXO Risk Assessment

1st Line Defence has assessed that there is an overall **Medium Risk** from German and anti-aircraft unexploded ordnance at the site of proposed works. There is an assessed **Negligible Risk** from Allied unexploded ordnance.

The Risk from German Air-Delivered UXO

- During WWII the site was situated in the Municipal Borough of Hornsey. According to official Home Office bombing statistics this borough sustained an overall high density of bombing, with 355 items of ordnance recorded to have fallen within the 2,872 acre borough, or an average of 123.6 items per 1,000 acres.
- During WWII, the south-western half of the site was occupied by a row of residential properties on Tottenham Lane whilst the north-eastern half of the site was occupied by the YMCA building.
- Multiple bomb strikes were recorded within the site's immediate vicinity across mapping and written records in November 1940. London Bomb Census Mapping records one HE bomb strike directly on / directly north-west of the site, with another bomb strike recorded directly south-east on Tottenham Lane. An incendiary bombing 'shower' is also recorded across the site in October 1940.
- Similarly, the Hornsey Register of Incidents, Air Raid Damage Records and Incident Records each recorded one HE on the roadway outside the YMCA building on Tottenham Lane on the 1st/2nd November 1940; with this building being situated on site, and the roadway directly bordering. Another HE bomb fell on this date approximately 60m north-west of the site, and one further bomb is also recorded approximately 40m north-west of the site the following week, on the 8th/9th November 1940.
- Middlesex County Council (MCC) War Damage Mapping indicates that the residential properties on site and adjacent sustained 'Category 2' damage: "some repairs possible, but could become Cat 1" (with Category 1 referring to "total damage, building to be demolished"). Meanwhile the YMCA building and adjacent properties are described as being subject to 'Category 3' damage; "border line areas, uncertain whether repairs possible, might have to be demolished". This is corroborated by both post-war OS mapping as well as post-war aerial photography dated 1947 which indicates that the majority of the structures on and adjacent to the site had been cleared, with only the YMCA still standing.
- Damage to the YMCA building and neighbouring residential properties on site is further corroborated by online sources; one states that "the building sustained some bomb damage whilst neighbouring houses and the cinema opposite were completely destroyed", and another notes that "the centre was on the edge of a high explosive impact during World War II and suffered considerable damage."

- Any items of UXO are considered more likely to go missing, and thus unreported, in areas subject to clearance and bombing damage; ruins, rubble, and debris likely present across the site following the bombing in November 1940 could have easily obscured evidence of UXO, such as bomb entry holes, which could be as small as 20cm in diameter. Therefore, groundcover on site for the majority of the war is not thought to have been conducive to UXO detection.
- Furthermore, following the bomb strikes and significant damage sustained on and within the site's immediate vicinity, access to the site is thought to have been significantly reduced, as the area would have been evacuated and deemed unsafe. Evidence of UXO is more likely to go unnoticed and unrecorded within infrequently accessed areas.
- In summary, multiple bomb strikes were recorded on / within the site's immediate vicinity, along with a significant level of damage / clearance to the structures on and adjacent to the site. Following the bomb strikes and damage recorded, and the clearance evident on aerial photography and OS mapping, it is anticipated that access to the site would have been infrequent for the majority of the war, and groundcover would not have been conducive to UXO detection, with the potential for rubble to obscure a UXB entry hole. As a result of these factors, the site is therefore considered to be at a **Medium Risk** of UXO contamination.

The Risk from Allied UXO

- No evidence could be found to indicate that the site formerly had any military occupation or usage that could have led to contamination with items of Allied ordnance, such as LSA and SAA.
- The conditions in which HAA or LAA projectiles may have fallen unnoticed within the site boundary are however analogous to those regarding air delivered ordnance.

Post-WWII Redevelopment

- Pre-war residential buildings are shown to have been cleared on 1950s post-war OS mapping. Recent aerial imagery indicates an extension of the existing YMCA centre has taken place in the years since WWII.
- The risk of UXO remaining is considered to be mitigated at the location of and down to the depth of any post-war redevelopment on site. For example, the risk from deep buried UXO will only have been mitigated within the volumes of any post-war pile foundations or deep excavations for basement levels. The risk will however remain within virgin geology below and amongst these post-war works, down to the maximum bomb penetration depth.

Recommended Risk Mitigation Measures

The following risk mitigation measures are recommended to support the proposed works at the YLCAN – Crouch End site:

Activity	Recommended Risk Mitigation Measure
All Works	- UXO Risk Management Plan - Site Specific UXO Awareness Briefings to all personnel conducting intrusive works.
Open Excavations (trial pits, service pits, bulk excavations, strip foundations etc.)	UXO Specialist On-site Support
Boreholes and Piled Foundations	Intrusive Magnetometer Survey of all borehole and pile locations/clusters down to maximum bomb penetration depth.

Note – proactive on-site UXO support/survey should not be necessary for any works taking place at the location of and down to the depths of significantly worked post-war made ground/post-war fill.

Glossary

Abbreviation	Definition
AA	Anti-Aircraft
AFS	Auxiliary Fire Service
AP	Anti-Personnel
ARP	Air Raid Precautions
DA	Delay-action
EOC	Explosive Ordnance Clearance
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
FP	Fire Pot
GM	G Mine (Parachute mine)
HAA	Heavy Anti-Aircraft
HE	High Explosive
IB	Incendiary Bomb
JSEODOC	Joint Services Explosive Ordnance Disposal Operation Centre
LAA	Light Anti-Aircraft
LCC	London County Council
LRRB	Long Range Rocket Bomb (V-2)
LSA	Land Service Ammunition
NFF	National Filling Factory
OB	Oil Bomb
PAC	Pilotless Aircraft (V-1)
PB	Phosphorous Bomb
PM	Parachute Mine
POW	Prisoner Of War
RAF	Royal Air Force
RCAF	Royal Canadian Air Force
RFC	Royal Flying Corps
RNAS	Royal Naval Air Service
ROF	Royal Ordnance Factory
SA	Small Arms
SAA	Small Arms Ammunition
SD2	Anti-personnel "Butterfly Bomb"
SIP	Self-Igniting Phosphorous
U/C	Unclassified bomb
UP	Unrotated Projectile (rocket)
USAAF	United States Army Air Force
UX	Unexploded
UXAA	Unexploded Anti-Aircraft
UXB	Unexploded Bomb
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance
V-1	Flying Bomb (Doodlebug)
V-2	Long Range Rocket
WAAF	Women's Auxiliary Air Force
X	Exploded

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1st Line Defence Limited®

Detailed Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) Risk Assessment

Site: YLCAN – Crouch End
Client: YMCA London City and North

1. Introduction

1.1. Background

1st Line Defence has been commissioned by YMCA London City and North to conduct a Detailed Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) Risk Assessment for the works proposed at YLCAN Crouch End.

Buried UXO can present a significant risk to construction works and development projects. The discovery of a suspect device during works can cause considerable disruption to operations as well as cause unwanted delays and expense.

UXO in the UK can originate from three principal sources:

1. Munitions resulting from wartime activities including German bombing in WWI and WWII, long range shelling, and defensive activities.
2. Munitions deposited as a result of military training and exercises.
3. Munitions lost, burnt, buried or otherwise discarded either deliberately, accidentally, or ineffectively.

This report will assess the potential factors that may contribute to the risk of UXO contamination. If an elevated risk is identified at the site, this report will recommend appropriate mitigation measures, in order to reduce the risk to as low as is reasonably practicable. Detailed analysis and evidence will be provided to ensure an understanding of the basis for the assessed risk level and any recommendations.

This report complies with the guidelines outlined in CIRIA C681, 'Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) A Guide for the Construction Industry.'

2. Method Statement

2.1. Report Objectives

The aim of this report is to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the potential risk from UXO at YLCAN – Crouch End. The report will also recommend appropriate site and work-specific risk mitigation measures to reduce the risk from explosive ordnance during the envisaged works to a level that is as low as reasonably practicable.

2.2. Risk Assessment Process

1st Line Defence has undertaken a five-step process for assessing the risk of UXO contamination:

1. The likelihood that the site was contaminated with UXO.
2. The likelihood that UXO remains on the site.
3. The likelihood that UXO may be encountered during the proposed works.
4. The likelihood that UXO may be initiated.
5. The consequences of initiating or encountering UXO.

In order to address the above, 1st Line Defence has taken into consideration the following factors:

- Evidence of WWI and WWII German air delivered bombing as well as the legacy of Allied occupation.
- The nature and conditions of the site during WWII.
- The extent of post-war development and UXO clearance operations on site.
- The scope and nature of the proposed works and the maximum assessed bomb penetration depth.
- The nature of ordnance that may have contaminated the proposed site area.

2.3. Sources of Information

Every reasonable effort has been made to ensure that relevant evidence has been consulted and presented in order to produce a thorough and comprehensible report for the client. To achieve this the following, which includes military records and archive material held in the public domain, have been accessed:

- The National Archives and Haringey Archives.
- Historical mapping datasets.
- Historic England National Monuments Record.
- Relevant information supplied by YMCA London City and North.
- Available material from 33 Engineer Regiment (EOD) Archive (part of 29 Explosive Ordnance and Disposal and Search Group).
- 1st Line Defence's extensive historical archives, library and UXO geo-datasets.
- Open sources such as published books and internet resources.

3. Background to Bombing Records

3.1. General Considerations of Historical Research

This desktop assessment is based largely upon analysis of historical evidence. Every reasonable effort has been made to locate and present significant and pertinent information. 1st Line Defence cannot be held accountable for any changes to the assessed risk level or risk mitigation measures, based on documentation or other data that may come to light at a later date, or which was not available to 1st Line Defence during the production of this report.

It is often problematic and sometimes impossible to verify the completeness and accuracy of WWII-era records. As a consequence, conclusions as to the exact location and nature of a UXO risk can rarely be quantified and are, to a degree, subjective. To counter this, a range of sources have been consulted, presented and analysed. The same methodology is applied to each report during the risk assessment process. 1st Line Defence cannot be held responsible for any inaccuracies or the incompleteness in available historical information.

3.2. German Bombing Records

During WWII, bombing records were generally gathered locally by the police, Air Raid Precaution (ARP) wardens and military personnel. These records typically contained information such as the date, the location, the amount of damage caused and the types of bombs that had fallen during an air raid. This information was made either through direct observation or post-raid surveys. The Ministry of Home Security Bomb Census Organisation would then receive this information, which was plotted onto maps, charts, and tracing sheets by regional technical officers. The collective record set (regional bomb census mapping and locally gathered incidents records) would then be processed and summarised into reports by the Ministry of Home Security Research and Experiments Branch. The latter were tasked with providing the government 'a complete picture of air raid patterns, types of weapons used and damage caused- in particular to strategic services and installations such as railways, shipyards, factories and public utilities.'

The quality, detail and nature of record keeping could vary considerably between provincial towns, boroughs and cities. No two areas identically collated or recorded data. While some local authorities maintained records with a methodical approach, sources in certain areas can be considerably more vague, dispersed, and narrower in scope. In addition, the immediate priority was mostly focused on assisting casualties and minimising damage at the time. As a result, some records can be incomplete and contradictory. Furthermore, many records were even damaged or destroyed in subsequent air raids. Records of raids that took place on sparsely or uninhabited areas were often based upon third party or hearsay information and are therefore not always reliable. Whereas records of attacks on military or strategic targets were often maintained separately and have not always survived.

3.3. Allied Records

During WWII, considerable areas of land were requisitioned by the War Office for the purpose of defence, training, munitions production and the construction of airfields. Records relating to military features vary and some may remain censored. Within urban environments datasets will be consulted detailing the location of munition production as well as wartime air and land defences. In rural locations it may be possible to obtain plans of military establishments, such as airfields, as well as training logs, record books, plans and personal memoirs. As with bombing records, every reasonable effort will be made to access records of, and ascertain any evidence of, military land use. However, there are occasions where such evidence is not available, as records may not be accessible, have been lost/destroyed, or simply were not kept in the first place.

4. UK Regulatory Environment and Guidelines

4.1. General

There is no formal obligation requiring a UXO risk assessment to be undertaken for construction projects in the UK, nor is there any specific legislation stipulating the management or mitigation of UXO risk. However, it is implicit in the legislation outlined below that those responsible for intrusive works (archaeology, site investigation, drilling, piling, excavation etc.) should undertake a comprehensive and robust assessment of the potential risks to employees and that mitigation measures are implemented to address any identified hazards.

4.2. CDM Regulations 2015

The Construction (Design and Management) Regulations 2015 (CDM 2015) define the responsibilities of parties involved in the construction of temporary or permanent structures.

The CDM 2015 establishes a duty of care extending from clients, principle designers, and contractors to those working on, or affected by, a project. Those responsible for construction projects may therefore be accountable for the personal or proprietary loss of third parties, if correct health and safety procedure has not been applied.

Although the CDM does not specifically reference UXO, the risk presented by such items is both within the scope and purpose of the legislation. It is therefore implied that there is an obligation for parties to:

- Provide an appropriate assessment of potential UXO risks at the site (or ensure such an assessment is completed by others).
- Put in place appropriate risk mitigation measures if necessary.
- Supply all parties with information relevant to the risks presented by the project.
- Ensure the preparation of a suitably robust emergency response plan.

4.3. The 1974 Health and Safety at Work etc. Act

All employers have a responsibility under the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 and the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999, to ensure the health and safety of their employees and third parties, so far as is reasonably practicable and conduct suitable and sufficient risk assessments.

4.4. CIRIA C681

In 2009, the Construction Industry Research and Information Association (CIRIA) produced a guide to the risk posed by UXO to the UK construction industry (CIRIA C681). CIRIA is a neutral, independent and not-for-profit body, linking organisations with common interests and facilitating a range of collaborative activities that help improve the industry.

The publication provides the UK construction industry with a defined process for the management of risks associated with UXO from WWI and WWII air bombardment. It is also broadly applicable to the risks from other forms of UXO that might be encountered. It focuses on construction professionals' needs, particularly if there is a suspected item of UXO on site, and covers issues such as what to expect from a UXO specialist. The guidance also helps clients to fulfil their legal duty under CDM 2015 to provide designers and contractors with project specific health and safety information needed to identify hazards and risks associated with the design and construction work. This report conforms to this CIRIA guidance and to the various recommendations for good practice referenced therein. It is recommended that this document is acquired and studied where possible to allow a better understanding of the background to both the risk assessment process and the UXO issue in the UK in general.

4.5. Additional Legislation

In the event of a casualty resulting from the failure of an employer/client to address the risks relating to UXO, the organisation may be criminally liable under the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007.

5. The Role of Commercial UXO Contractors and The Authorities

5.1. Commercial UXO Specialists

The role of a UXO Specialist (often referred to as UXO Consultant or UXO Contractor) such as 1st Line Defence, is defined in CIRIA C681 as the provision of expert knowledge and guidance to the client on the most appropriate and cost-effective approach to UXO risk management at a site.

The principal role of UXO Specialists is to provide the client with an appropriate assessment of the risk posed by UXO for a specific project, and identify and carry out suitable methodology for the mitigation of any identified risks to reduce them to an acceptable level.

The requirement for a UXO Specialist should ideally be identified in the initial stages of a project, and it is recommended that this occur prior to the start of any detailed design. This will enable the client to budget for expenditure that may be required to address the risks from UXO, and may enable the project team to identify appropriate techniques to eliminate or reduce potential risks through considered design, without the need for UXO specific mitigation measures. The UXO Specialist should have suitable qualifications, levels of competency and insurances.

Please note 1st Line Defence has the capability to provide a complete range of required UXO risk mitigation services, in order to reduce a risk to as low as reasonably practicable. This can involve the provision of both ground investigation, and where appropriate, UXO clearance services.

5.2. The Authorities

The police have a responsibility to co-ordinate the emergency services in the event of an ordnance-related incident at a construction site. Upon inspection they may impose a safety cordon, order an evacuation, and call the military authorities Joint Services Explosive Ordnance Disposal Operation Centre (JSEODOC) to arrange for investigation and/or disposal. Within the Metropolitan Police Operational Area, SO15 EOD will be tasked to any discovery of suspected UXO. The request for Explosive Officer (Expo) support is well understood and practiced by all Metropolitan Boroughs. The requirement for any additional assets will then be coordinated by the Expo if required.

In the absence of a UXO specialist, police officers will usually employ such precautionary safety measures, thereby causing works to cease, and possibly requiring the evacuation of neighbouring businesses and properties.

The priority given to the police request will depend on the EOD teams' judgement of the nature of the UXO risk, the location, people and assets at risk, as well as the availability of resources. The speed of response varies; authorities may respond immediately or in some cases it may take several days for the item of ordnance to be dealt with. Depending on the on-site risk assessment the item of ordnance may be removed from the site and/or destroyed by a controlled explosion.

Following the removal of an item of UXO, the military authorities will only undertake further investigations or clearances in high-risk situations. If there are regular UXO finds on a site the JSEODOC may not treat each occurrence as an emergency and will recommend the construction company puts in place alternative procedures, such as the appointment of a commercial contractor to manage the situation.

6. The Site

6.1. Site Location

The site is located in Crouch End, within the London Borough of Haringey.

The site is bound to the north-east by Elmfield Avenue, to the south-east by the A103 Tottenham Lane, to the south-west by Rosebery Gardens, and to the west by residential properties.

The site is approximately centred on the OS grid reference: **TQ 30307 88687**.

Site location maps are presented in **Annex A**.

6.2. Site Description

The site is occupied by a five-storey semi-detached YMCA hostel property fronting Tottenham Lane.

A recent aerial photograph and site plan are presented in **Annex B** and **Annex C** respectively.

7. Scope of the Proposed Works

7.1. General

The nature and extent of works proposed was not available at the time of writing.

8. Ground Conditions

8.1. General Geology

The British Geological Survey (BGS) map shows the bedrock geology of the site to be underlain by the London Clay Formation – clay, silt and sand. Sedimentary bedrock formed between 56 and 47.8 million years ago during the Palaeogene period.

8.2. Site-Specific Geology

Site-specific geotechnical data was not provided by the client during the production of this report.

9. Site History

9.1. Introduction

The purpose of this section is to identify the composition of the site pre and post-WWII. It is important to establish the historical use of the site, as this may indicate the site's relation to potential sources of UXO as well as help with determining factors such as the land use, groundcover, likely frequency of access and signs of bomb damage.

9.2. Ordnance Survey Historical Maps

Relevant historical maps were obtained for this report and are presented in **Annex D**. See below for a summary of the site history shown on acquired mapping.

Pre-WWII		
Date	Scale	Description
1935	1:2,500	Pre-WWII OS mapping dated 1935 indicates that the south-western half of the site was occupied by residential properties, whilst the north-eastern half was occupied by a <i>Y.M.C.A.</i> centre. The site was bordered by residential properties to the west, facing <i>Elmfield Avenue</i> which bordered the site to the north and <i>Rosebery Gardens</i> which bordered the site to the south-west. <i>Tottenham Lane</i> borders the site to the south.

Post-WWII		
Date	Scale	Description
1952-55	1:2,500	Post-war OS mapping dated 1952-55 shows the clearance of the residential properties previously situated within the south-western half of the site. The <i>YMCA Hostel</i> remains situated within the north-eastern portion of the site however.

10. Introduction to German Air Delivered Ordnance

10.1. General

During WWI and WWII, the UK was subjected to bombing which often resulted in extensive damage to city centres, docks, rail infrastructure and industrial areas. The poor accuracy of WWII targeting technology and the nature of bombing techniques often resulted in neighbouring areas to targets sustaining collateral damage.

In addition to raids which concentrated on specific targets, indiscriminate bombing of large areas also took place. This occurred most prominently in the London 'Blitz', though affected many other towns and cities. As discussed in the following sections, a proportion of the bombs dropped on the UK did not detonate as designed. Although extensive efforts were made to locate and deal with these UXBs at the time, many still remain buried and can present a potential risk to construction projects.

The main focus of research for this section of the report will concern German air delivered ordnance dropped during WWII, although WWI bombing will also be considered.

10.2. Generic Types of WWII German Air Delivered Ordnance

To provide an informed assessment of the hazards posed by any items of unexploded ordnance that may remain in situ on site, the table below provides information on the types of German air delivered ordnance most commonly used by the Luftwaffe during WWII. Images and brief summaries of the characteristics of these items of ordnance are listed in **Appendices i-iii**.

Generic Types of WWII German Air Delivered Ordnance		
Type	Frequency	Likelihood of Detection
High Explosive (HE) bombs	In terms of weight of ordnance dropped, HE bombs were the most frequently deployed by the Luftwaffe during WWII.	Although efforts were made to identify the presence of unexploded ordnance following an air raid, often the damage and destruction caused by detonated bombs made observation of UXB entry holes impossible. The entry hole of an unexploded bomb can be as little as 20cm in diameter and was easily overlooked in certain ground conditions (see Annex E). Furthermore, ARP documents describe the danger of assuming that damage, actually caused by a large UXB, was due to an exploded smaller bomb. UXBs therefore present the greatest risk to present-day intrusive works.
1kg Incendiary bombs (IB)	In terms of the number of weapons dropped, small IBs were the most numerous. Millions of these were dropped throughout WWII.	IBs had very limited penetration capability and in urban areas would often have been located in post-raid surveys. If they failed to initiate and fell in water, on soft vegetated ground, or bombed rubble, they could easily go unnoticed.
Large Incendiary bombs (IB)	These were not as common as the 1kg IBs, although they were more frequently deployed than PMs and AP bomblets.	If large IBs did penetrate the ground, complete combustion did not always occur and in such cases they could remain a risk to intrusive works.
Aerial or Parachute mines (PM)	These were deployed less frequently than HE and IBs due to size, cost and the difficulty of deployment.	If functioning correctly, PMs would generally have had a slow rate of descent and were very unlikely to have penetrated the ground. Where the parachute failed, mines would have simply shattered on impact if the main charge failed to explode. There have been extreme cases when these items have been found unexploded. However, in these scenarios, the ground was either extremely soft or the munition fell into water.
Anti-personnel (AP) bomblets	These were not commonly used and are generally considered to pose a low risk to most works in the UK.	SD2 bomblets were packed into containers holding between 6 and 108 submunitions. They had little ground penetration ability and should have been located by the post-raid survey unless they fell into water, dense vegetation or bomb rubble.

10.3. Failure Rate of German Air Delivered Ordnance

It has been estimated that 10% of WWII German air delivered HE bombs failed to explode as designed. Reasons for why such weapons might have failed to function as designed include:

- Malfunction of the fuze or gain mechanism (manufacturing fault, sabotage by forced labour or faulty installation).
- Many were fitted with a clockwork mechanism that could become immobilised on impact.
- Failure of the bomber aircraft to arm the bombs due to human error or an equipment defect.
- Jettisoning the bomb before it was armed or from a very low altitude. This most likely occurred if the bomber aircraft was under attack or crashing.

From 1940 to 1945, bomb disposal teams reportedly dealt with a total of 50,000 explosive items of 50kg, over 7,000 anti-aircraft projectiles and 300,000 beach mines. Unexploded ordnance is still regularly encountered across the UK, see press articles in **Annex F**.

10.4. UXB Ground Penetration

An important consideration when assessing the risk from a UXB is the likely maximum depth of burial. There are several factors which determine the depth that an unexploded bomb will penetrate:

- Mass and shape of bomb.
- Height of release.
- Velocity and angle of bomb.
- Nature of the ground cover.
- Underlying geology.

Geology is perhaps the most important variable. If the ground is soft, there is a greater potential of deeper penetration. For example, peat and alluvium are easier to penetrate than gravel and sand, whereas layers of hard strata will significantly retard and may stop the trajectory of a UXB.

10.4.1. The J-Curve Principle

J-curve is the term used to describe the characteristic curve commonly followed by an air delivered bomb dropped from height after it penetrates the ground. Typically, as the bomb is slowed by its passage through underlying soils, its trajectory curves towards the surface. Many UXBs are found with their nose cone pointing upwards as a result of this effect. More importantly, however, is the resulting horizontal offset from the point of entry. This is typically a distance of about one third of the bomb's penetration depth, but can be higher in certain conditions (see **Annex E**).

10.4.2. WWII UXB Ground Penetration Studies

During WWII the Ministry of Home Security undertook a major study on actual bomb penetration depths, carrying out statistical analysis on the measured depths of 1,328 bombs as reported by bomb disposal (BD) teams. Conclusions were drawn predicting the likely average and maximum depths of penetration of different sized bombs in different geological strata.

For example, the largest common German bomb (500kg) had a likely concluded penetration depth of 6m in sand or gravel but 11m in clay. The maximum observed depth for a 500kg bomb was 11.4m and for a 1,000kg bomb 12.8m. Theoretical calculations suggested that significantly greater penetration depths were probable.

10.4.3. Site Specific Bomb Penetration Considerations

When considering an assessment of the bomb penetration at the site of proposed works the following parameters should be used:

- WWII geology – London Clay Formation.
- Impact angle and velocity – 10-15° from vertical and 270 metres per second.
- Bomb mass and configuration – The 500kg SC HE bomb, without retarder units or armour piercing nose (this was the largest of the common bombs used against Britain).

It has not been possible to determine maximum bomb penetration capabilities at this stage due to the limitations of site-specific geotechnical information provided for the purpose of this report. An assessment can be made once further information becomes available or by an UXO Specialist on-site.

10.5. V-Weapons

Hitler's 'V-weapon' campaign began from mid-1944. It used newly developed unmanned cruise missiles and rockets. The V-1, known as the flying bomb or pilotless aircraft, and the V-2, a long range rocket, were launched from bases in Germany and occupied Europe. A total of 2,419 V-1s and 517 V-2s were recorded in the London Civil Defence region alone.

Although these weapons caused considerable damage, their relatively low numbers allowed accurate records of strikes to be maintained. These records have mostly survived. There is a negligible risk from unexploded V-weapons on land today. Even if the 1,000kg warhead failed to explode, the weapons are so large that they would have been observed and dealt with at the time. Therefore, any V-weapons referenced in this report are referenced not as a viable risk factor, but primarily in order to help account for evidence of damage and clearance reported.