

London Borough of Haringey
Planning and Building Control
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Planning Case Officer : Valerie Okeiyi

Our ref: NE 7459

Designing Out Crime Office
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111-117 Bow Road
Tower Hamlets
E3 2AN

Email: ian.waylen@met.police.uk

Dated: 14/11/2024

Application Number: HGY/2024/0466

Location: 157-159, Hornsey Park Road, London, N8 0JX

Proposal: Demolition of existing structures and erection of two buildings to provide residential units and Class E floorspace; and provision of associated landscaping, a new pedestrian route, car and cycle parking, and refuse and recycling facilities.

Dear Haringey Planning,

Section 1 - Introduction:

Thank you for allowing us to comment on the above planning proposal.

With reference to the above application we have had an opportunity to examine the details submitted and would like to offer the following comments, observations and recommendations. These are based on relevant information to this site (Please see Appendices), including my knowledge and experience as a Designing Out Crime Officer and as a Police Officer.

It is in our professional opinion that crime prevention and community safety are material considerations because of the mixed use, complex design, layout and the sensitive location of the development. To ensure the delivery of a safer development in line with L.B. Haringey DMM4 and DMM5 (See Appendix), we have highlighted some of the main comments we have in relation to Crime Prevention (Appendices 1).

Metropolitan Police Service Designing out Crime Group do not provide a consultation service solely for the purposes of meeting the BREEAM Security Needs Assessment. However, the Metropolitan Police Service Designing out Crime Group can assist the developer to achieve the relevant BREEAM credit for Safety and Security via an application for Secured by Design accreditation (SBD). A signed and dated SBD application form should be emailed to the above email address. Please note full submissions should be accompanied with full product details – to include all door and window specifications etc.

I can confirm we have met with the project design team to review Safety, Security or Crime Prevention.

We have concerns around some aspects of the design and layout of the development. At this point it can be difficult to design out fully any issues identified. At best crime can only be mitigated against, as it does not fully reduce the opportunity of offences.

Whilst in principle we have no objections to the site, we have recommended the attaching of suitably worded conditions and an informative. The comments made can easily be mitigated early if the Architects ensure the ongoing dialogue with our department continues throughout the design and build process. This can be achieved by the below Secured by Design conditions being applied (Section 2). If the Conditions are applied, we request the completion of the relevant SBD application forms at the earliest opportunity.

The project has the potential to achieve a Secured by Design Accreditation if advice given is adhered to.

Section 2 - Secured by Design Conditions and Informative:

Should planning consent be granted for this application, we would request the following conditions and informative:

Conditions:

- A. Prior to the commencement of above ground works of each building or part of a building, details shall be submitted to and approved, in writing, by the Local Planning Authority to demonstrate that such building or such part of a building can achieve '**Secured by Design**' Accreditation. Accreditation must be achievable according to current and relevant **Secured by Design** guide lines at the time of above grade works of each building or phase of said development.
The development shall only be carried out in accordance with the approved details.
- B. Prior to the first occupation of each building, or part of a building or its use, '**Secured by Design**' certification shall be obtained for such building or part of such building or its use and thereafter all features are to be retained.

Reason: In the interest of creating safer, sustainable communities.

Informative:

The applicant must seek the continual advice of the Metropolitan Police Service Designing Out Crime Officers (DOCOs) to achieve accreditation. The services of MPS DOCOs are available **free of charge** and can be contacted via docomailbox.ne@met.police.uk.

Section 3 - Conclusion:

We would ask that our department's interest in this planning application is noted and that we are advised of the final **Decision Notice**, with attention drawn to any changes within the development and subsequent Condition that has been implemented with crime prevention, security and community

safety in mind.

Should the Planning Authority require clarification of any of the recommendations/comments given in the appendices please do not hesitate to contact us at the above office.

Yours sincerely,

Ian Waylen 1973CO

Designing Out Crime Officer
Metropolitan Police Service

This report gives recommendations. Please note that Crime Prevention Advice and the information in this report does not constitute legal or other professional advice; it is given free and without the intention of creating a contract or without the intention of accepting any legal responsibility. It is based on the information supplied and current crime trends in the area. All other applicable health, safety and fire regulations should be adhered to.

Appendix 1: Concerns and Comments

In summary we have overall site specific comments in relation to the following items. This list is not exhaustive and acts as initial observations based on the available plans from the architect and local authority planning portal.

Site specific advice may change depending on further information provided or site limitations as the project develops:

This list is not exhaustive and acts as concerns raised during consultation with the architects pre-application.

To be utilised in further discussions with the appointed developer at a later stage.

Boundary Treatment

- Ideally side and rear boundary onto the public realm should be 2.4m (potentially 1.8m with 600mm trellis or 2.1m with a 300mm trellis). Any vertical transom (support) should be inward facing
- Metal fabrication, should be robust, have an unfinished top rail (exposed tops), to deter loitering, sitting and climbing. We recommend 358 gauge weld mesh fence panels
- If fencing is constructed of wood material, ensure panels are vertical with no support beams allowing climbing opportunities. Panels to be mechanically secured in place to prevent lift removal
- All perimeter railings to have a maximum 50mm spacing centre to centre, be set flush to the front of any wall. If strengthened with mid rail must be designed to deter climbing

and mid rail to be inward facing. Any perimeter boundary treatment (railings) should be between 1.8m - ideally designed to provide visual permeability

- Gates to be designed level to the front building line, any locking mechanism, hinges to be anti-climb and fitted with a dampened stop. Gating to be inclusive of a self-closer and the same height as the perimeter treatment including any trellising
- Where possible building lines should be flush to allow natural surveillance, any recesses should not exceed 600mm
- If anti-climbing measures are introduced then signage should be used to comply with occupier's liability Act 1984
- Any boundary treatments should be UKAS certified as recommended by a DOCO
- All low defensive wall/railings to be designed to deter sitting, loitering and climbing.

Access Control

- Access control is required to maintain compartmentation in communal areas. All panels to have audio/visual capability.
- Access control panels to have audio/visual capability. Primary camera on panel to capture all visitors. They should achieve the Secured by Design required standard – UL293 (anti-vandal).
- Doorset preferred locking mechanism is Magnetic locks (Communal areas) - 2 x 500kg (minimum) resistance (1200lbs/psi) placed a third from the top and a third from the bottom.
- Key fob access control with a data logging system is recommended as this is more efficient to deactivate/replace lost/stolen keys. It can also assist with identifying any misuse.
- Data to be stored for one calendar month before being over written. This data should be available to Police within 24 hours for evidential purposes should it be required. Consideration to be given to appropriate and sufficient hard drive storage.
- **No** Trade Button on control panel.
- Emergency Exit (push to release) primary egress routes that are required to have an emergency escape mechanism should be self-resetting, shrouded and in best practice to be alarmed.
- Plant/Service room door set/s accessible by public realm are required to be one of the following UKAS certified products:
 - LPS1175 issue 7 SR2 (or LPS 1175 Issue 8 B3) or
 - STS202 Issue 3:2011 BR 2+ or
 - LPS2081 SRB or Equivalent certification
- Consideration required regarding the security/risk management to Internet Of Things (IOT).

Note: Service/plant door/s should be self-closing, self-locking single doors.

ACB (Access Control Box) / Fire Access

- An external fire over ride switch (FOS) should be protected with the use of an accredited security product such as a Gerda Box. Consideration to other suppliers of this type of fire switch protection method should be given, check SbD web site. In addition to the use of an ACB see below re Premises Information Box (PIB).
<https://www.gerdasecurity.co.uk/access-control-protection-acb-gfs/>

- Premises information box (PIB) typically used to store site specific documentation such as communal access routes, fire risers etc. PIB is generally located behind the primary security layer and is intended for LFB use only (Refer to current Homes guidance)
- If the cause and effect of a fire over ride switch (FOS) activation poses a crime risk consideration to a Drop Key Protection Box should be made
- The project fire consultant should be made aware of any Part B Security v's Safety conflicts.

Doors

- External communal door set/s should be flush with the building line to prevent any recesses. Any recesses should not exceed 600mm. Doorset/s should be UKAS certified to:
 - LPS1175 issue 7 SR2 (or LPS 1175 Issue 8 B3) or
 - STS202 Issue 3:2011 BR 2+ or
 - LPS2081 SRB or Equivalent certification Fabricator 3rd party UKAS certification
- We recommend that customer / communal entrances have a secure lobby area to provide adequate security for staff / customers. The secondary lobby door set/s that are required to be dual certified to the following minimum standards:
 - LPS1175 issue 7 SR2 (or LPS 1175 Issue 8 B3) or
 - STS202 Issue 3:2011 BR 2+ or
 - LPS2081 SRB or Equivalent certification Fabricator 3rd party UKAS certification
 - PAS24:2022 (Subject to crime risk assessment)
- Part B Fire resistance must be taken into Consideration for the door
- All locks are to be part of the accredited PAS24:2022 specification.
- Residential front doors allowing direct access to the individual units should be tested and certificated to a minimum standard of PAS 24:2022.
- If the residential doors are required to be fire/smoke rated doors, Police recommend triple certified PAS 24:2022 doors and strongly advise that independent third party certification is obtained from a manufacturer. This will ensure the fire performance in relation to your needs, and to ensure compliance with both current Building Regulations and the advice issued by the Department for Communities and Local Government on 22nd June 2017 following the Grenfell Tower Fire.

Note: Communal door/s should be self-closing, self-locking single doors.

Windows

- All easily accessible windows (anything under 2m from another surface treatment) should be UKAS certified to either:
 - PAS24:2022 with BS EN356:2000 min.P2A glazing
 - STS204 Issue 6:2022,
 - STS202 Issue 7:2016 Burglary Rating 1
 - LPS1175 Issue 7.2:2014 Security Rating 1 or
 - LPS1175 Issue 8:2018 A1 Security Rating 1 or
 - LPS 2081 Issue 1.1:2016 Security Rating A.

Accessible windows includes any glass reached by climbing any number of floors via rain water pipes, balconies or via communal walkways (whether walkway accessed through secure door or not)

- Any window within 2m of an accessible surface should have key operated locks

- Where windows form an escape route, Part B (Fire) compliance should be adhered to
- All ground floor, vulnerable and accessible windows must have a lockable window restrictor to prevent unauthorised access
- Where curtain walling systems are proposed these should be certificated to either:
 - LPS1175 SR2
 - BS EN1627 RC3. **(With minimum of BS EN356:2000 P4A Glazing)**
 - PAS24:2022 with BS EN356:2000 min. P2A glazing (consider P3A). **Commercial windows to have a minimum of P4A glazing.**

Note: Curtain wall systems are non-structural cladding systems for the external walls of buildings. Typically curtain wall systems comprise a lightweight aluminium frame onto which glazed or opaque infill panels can be fixed. These infill panels are often described as 'glazing' whether or not they are made of glass.

Compartmentation

- Access control layers apply to both residents via fob and visitors via controlled access
Meet and Greet is NOT an option
- **Block A Communal Entrance**
 - Layer one – Secure communal area with UKAS LPS1175 issue 7 SR2 or equivalent doors at either end to create a secure the space leading up to the main communal entrance. Fob A/C with audio and visual control panel for visitors.
 - Layer Two – Key fob only for residents to enter ground floor stair core door, with push to exit. Fob only onto the residential threshold from stairs. Residents should only be able to access the threshold they reside on.
Separate control Audio control panel to control lift destination to each floor with CCTV in lift.
- **Block B Communal Entrance**
 - Layer one – Secure lobby area with fob for residents and A/V control for visitors for both commercial and residential.
 - Layer Two - create a secure lobby door to in front of lift with key fob and A/V access control panel. Key fob only for residents to enter ground floor stair core door, with push to exit. Fob only onto the residential threshold from stairs. Residents should only be able to access the threshold they reside on.
CCTV in lift.

Vehicle entrance – Install protective boundary to separate and secure pedestrian path from vehicle access.

Refuse Storage

- Ideally should not allow access into the building from the refuse store
- Street access doors to be single leaf and either
 - LPS1175 SR2 or
 - STS202 BR2/B3
- Doors to be single leaf (available up to 1500mm that facilitate 1100cc bins in LPS and STS), self-closing and self-locking with access control, ideally using magnetic locks to the previous documented standard. (2 x 500kg resistance (1200lbs/psi) positioned 1/3 from the top and 1/3 from bottom)

- If louvre doors are used, these should be of robust construction (ideally steel) supported with a layer of steel mesh to the rear to prevent unauthorised access to the locking mechanism and prevent general misuse
- A suitable level of lighting to be present within store, ideally low level at times of inactivity and full level illumination when in use. To compliment any CCTV. External lighting to be Dusk to Dawn covering door set
- No external signage identifying the refuse store
- CCTV should cover the refuse store and avoid positions that would restrict coverage.

Note: Single leaf doors are available up to approx. 1500mm to and will facilitate 1100cc bins in LPS and STS. This will eliminate the weakness of the passive leaf manually operated locking system which leaves double doors more vulnerable.

Cycle storage

- Internal access doors to be either:
 - LPS1175 issue 7 SR2 (or LPS 1175 Issue 8 B3) or
 - STS202 Issue 3:2011 BR 2+ or
 - LPS2081 SRB or Equivalent certificationMust be single leaf, self-closing and self-locking with access control ideally using magnetic locks
- Cycle storage lighting is required in all stores. In areas of no natural light or hours of darkness, a constant level of lighting is required for illumination. Connected lighting to provide low level lighting during inactivity and higher light levels when motion is detected
- **No** external signage
- CCTV must be installed in cycle stores. Should have unhindered views of the racking at all times and should be vandal resistant
- There should be 3 locking points for cycles on the racks/stands provided. Cycle racking should be secured with anti-tamper fixings
- Cycle store doors should allow light spill from with-in, either a small obscured viewing panel or robust louvre (as part of the door set)
- Internal signage should ideally be placed inside the store to reinforce importance of securing cycles
- If timber storage/sheds are to be used, then these must be of robust construction and designed to the SbD guidance (Sec 64). Requires at least 2 points of locking on the main door. If items of value are to be stored within the shed then a security anchor should be certificated to 'Sold Secure' Silver Standard LPS 1175 Issue 7.2:2014 Security Rating 1 or LPS 1175 Issue 8:2018 Security Rating A1
- Any Sheffield stands should be low level and shaped like the letter 'm', to deter people from sitting on them. The stands must be located in an area with good natural surveillance and tamper proof fixings used, to mitigate against theft or criminal damage.

CCTV / Alarm

- Any alarm installed should meet BS EN 50131 (as minimum)
- CCTV systems should conform to BS EN 62676: 2014 - video surveillance systems.
- CCTV should complement other security measures, not replace them. As a minimum police recommend coverage of the following areas:
 - Entrance & exit points including secondary coverage of call points
 - Foyer / Lobby areas

- Post boxes and Postal rooms
 - Cycle stores
 - Refuse stores
 - Top of stair cores
- Image quality should be able to provide facial recognition and colour HD quality during daylight and night time
- CCTV housing to be anti-vandal and potentially shrouded. Signage highlighting use of CCTV should be displayed throughout the development
- Footage should be preserved for a minimum of 31 days
- The footage must be of evidential value and stored for a minimum of 31 days. All footage to be time and date stamped and recorded in a format that is accessible to the local authority and police
- Any CCTV system that captures footage of public areas must comply with the regulations outlined by the Information Commissioner's Office
- To be stored securely on a remote cloud system, or on a locked and secured hard drive i.e. within a secure area behind a PAS24:2022 door or SR1 lockable steel cabinet
- Police access to footage must be within a minimum of 24 hours and a maximum of 48 hours for evidential purposes.

Postal Strategy

Due to crimes associated with letter plate apertures, such as Arson, Hate Crime, Lock Manipulation & fishing, Secured by Design strongly recommends where possible, mail delivery via a secured lobby, letter box TS009. It would be advised that all post is delivered into an airlock (preferred) or through the wall to reduce the likelihood of tailgating and postal theft. Through the wall letter plates should incorporate a sloping chute and anti-fishing attributes to mitigate against mail theft and meet TS008 standard. If post is to be delivered into an airlock then these should be securely surface mounted and meet TS009 standard.

MPS robust mailbox specification below:

- A minimum of 1.5mm thick galvanized steel construction. Its depth and width must allow mail to fall below the fishing plate unrestricted
- Fitted with a 3-point locking mechanism supported with a minimum five pin cam lock
- BS EN 1303:2005 (Inc corrigendum Aug 2009) compliant five/six pin camlock must have anti-drill, anti-bump and anti-pick lock attributes
- Gap restricting aperture (anti-fishing max 260mm x 40mm) The anti-fishing plate must be fabricated as part of the post box construction and extend into and across the full length of the letterbox opening to defend against the interference of mail, anti-leverage surrounding trim, welded claw on retrieval door to negate the ability to gain a leverage point and compromise the security of the mailbox
- Unit to have a minimum of 13Ltrs storage.

Lighting

- Public realm lighting whether adopted highways/footpaths/private estate roads or car parks should meet BS 5489:2020 standard
- Declaration of conformity should be overseen by an independent and competent lighting engineer. They should be qualified to at least **ILP Level 3 or 4** in line with the latest SBD guidance. <https://theilp.org.uk/>
- Internal lighting Communal elements of any scheme, ideally should be controlled by a photo electric sensor. This to ensure suitable levels of lighting at all times. Where no

natural light is available two phased lighting can be used (low level for non-activity, higher level once movement is detected)

- Lux is the measurement of light reaching a surface (1 lux is the light emitted from one candle that is 1m away from a surface 1sqm). Examples of suitable Lux levels are listed below:
 - Office interior (security) 05 Lux
 - Private car parks 10 Lux
 - Exterior Rural location 10 Lux
 - Exterior Urban location 20 Lux
 - Walkways 30 Lux
 - Loading bays 50 Lux

Further guidance is available in the “Lighting against crime” manual

- The even distribution of light across the area being illuminated. A good lighting system is one designed to distribute an appropriate amount of light evenly with uniformity and should include the following:
 - Values of between 0.25 and 0.40
 - Using lamps with a rating of at least 60 (minimum) on the Colour Rendering Index.
 - Good lighting will use energy efficient lamps in suitable luminaries
- Dusk-Till-Dawn lighting where possible should consist of white light which is evenly distributed. In communal areas all entrances should have dusk till dawn lighting supported via a photo electric cell. Allowing lighting to controlled automatically
- Bollard lighting **shall be avoided** due to its history of vandalism and ease of covering. Up lighters and decorative lighting can be used but only in unison with columns providing the required standards of light for good clear facial recognition illumination

Climbing Aids

- It is recommended that any climbing aids such as balconies, canopies, protruding brickwork/cladding etc., should not be positioned near any windows/doors and fixed flush with the building/boundary. This will mitigate against burglaries and domestic violence perpetrators.
- Canopies above entrances should be avoided to deter rough sleepers or the concealment of any perpetrators from misusing this area. If canopies are used then the depth must be below 600mm and they must be non-load bearing. If any canopy is robust enough to withstand a person standing on top, all nearby windows will be classed as vulnerable and therefore will be required to be PAS24 P2A.
- Any drain/rain pipes should ideally be internally installed. External drain/rain pipes should be of square design and sit flush against the building to prevent them being used as a climbing aid. They should be located away from any windows or balconies.

Roof Access

- AOV's should not be restricted from working, however can be reinforced potentially with fixed grille or railing (LPS 1175 SR1) to prevent unauthorised access
- Easily accessible roof lights should be a one of the following standards:
 - PAS24:2022 or
 - STS 204 (issue 6: 2016) or
 - LPS1175 (issue 7: 2014) SR1 or
 - LPS1175 (issue 8: 2018) SR1 / A1 or
 - STS202 (issue 7: 2016) BR1 or
 - LPS2081 (issue 1.1: 2016) SR A

- If roof door access is required for “maintenance only” the door should be PAS24:2022 as a minimum. This door should be secured ideally with a key. However, access control can be used in conjunction with a recommended locking mechanism and must be restricted to maintenance staff only.

Note - There are further concerns that need to be discussed with the applicant.

Lithium Ion Battery Devices and Vehicles Disclaimer

This development / application has cycle storage facilities and / or areas that may require the charging and storage of Lithium-ion powered vehicles or devices, within the building or the wider site footprint. The developer or developer’s agent must be aware that it is their responsibility to inform the Responsible Person(s), Fire and Rescue Service and Building Control of these storage facilities and areas, to ensure that the necessary fire suppression measures for the charging and storage of lithium-ion products have been considered and specified.

The LFB guidance on this matter can also be passed to partners who ask for additional guidance.

https://www.london-fire.gov.uk/media/8064/gn_103-charging-and-storage-for-electric-powered-personal-vehicles.pdf

Appendix 2: Planning Policy

London Plan 2021

Policy D11: Safety, Security and Resilience to Emergency

This policy links design out crime, counter terrorism prevention measures and acknowledges fire safety issues.

Section B of policy D11

Boroughs should work with their local Metropolitan Police Service ‘Design Out Crime’ officers and planning teams, whilst also working with other agencies such as the London Fire Commissioner, the City of London Police and the British Transport Police to identify the community safety needs, policies and sites required for their area to support provision of necessary infrastructure to maintain a safe and secure environment and reduce the fear of crime. Policies and any site allocations, where locally justified, should be set out in Development Plans.

Section C of policy D11

These measures should be considered at the start of the design process to ensure they are inclusive and aesthetically integrated into the development and the wider area. The policy considers not just crime, but also a wide range of hazards, such as fire, flood, extreme weather and terrorism.

New buildings should therefore be **resilient** to all of these threats.

Paragraph 3.11.3

Measures to **design out crime**, including counter terrorism measures, should be integral to development proposals and considered early in the design process, taking into account the principles contained in guidance such as the Secured by Design Scheme published by the Police.... This will ensure development proposals provide adequate protection, do not compromise good design, do not shift vulnerabilities elsewhere, and are cost-effective. Development proposals should incorporate measures that are proportionate to the threat of the risk of an attack and the likely consequences of one.

Paragraph 3.11.4

The Metropolitan Police (Designing Out Crime Officers and Counter Terrorism Security Advisors) should be consulted to ensure major developments contain appropriate design solutions, which mitigate the potential level of risk whilst ensuring the quality of places is maximised.

Paragraph 3.12.10

Fire safety and security measures should be considered in conjunction with one another, in particular to avoid potential conflicts between security measures and means of escape or access of the fire and rescue service. Early consultation between the London Fire Brigade and the Metropolitan Police Service can successfully resolve any such issues.

DMM4 (Policy DM2) Part A(d) "Have regard to the principles set out in 'Secured by Design'"

DMM5: Para 2.14 - "Proposals will be assessed against the principles of secured by design'. The latest published guidance in this respect should be referred."

An Independent Sustainability report by AECOM on Tottenham area action plan states: *"Crime is high in Tottenham with many residents concerned about safety, gang activity and high crime rates. Issues are particularly associated with Northumberland Park and Tottenham Hale".*

12.3 of same report states:

- Crime rates are relatively high across the borough and crime is particularly prevalent in Northumberland Park. There is a need to design schemes in order to reduce levels of crime, fear of crime and anti-social behavior. Since unemployment is strongly correlated with acquisitive crime, there may also be a link to wider economic development.
- There are no references to crime in the **overarching policies**, although it is recognised that housing and economic policies aim to support a very significant level of regeneration in the area. This could indirectly lead to reduced crime / fear of crime in the medium term through creating more high quality environments and more stable communities. **AAP 06** includes requirements on urban design and character and seeks to maximise opportunities to create legible neighbourhoods, which may assist in creating safe, modern and high quality places.
- There are no references to crime in the **neighbourhood area sections**; however they do set out key objectives which include considerations for safe and accessible environments. Furthermore, as noted above, the scale of regeneration proposed should indirectly lead to reductions in crime and fear of crime. Crime is particularly high in Northumberland Park and Tottenham Hale, hence this issue might be explicitly addressed in these sections; however, it is recognised that the DM Policies DPD includes Borough wide requirements in this regard. Also, AAP 06 sets out the

Council's commitment to preparing Design Code Supplementary Planning Documents (SPDs) for Tottenham's Growth Areas, where opportunities for secure by design principles can be investigated.

- In **conclusion**, the plan is likely to result in positive effects on the crime baseline if there is large scale regeneration (including jobs growth) and robust implementation of safer streets and other measures to design out crime in Tottenham, including particularly in Northumberland Park where crime levels are highest.

The **Supplementary Planning Documents 'Designing Safer Places'** and **'Landscaping'** provide further additional guidance supporting the recommendations.

- **Section 17 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1988** states "It shall be the duty of each Authority to which this section applies to exercise its various functions with due regard to the likely effect of the exercise of those functions on and the need to do all it reasonably can to prevent Crime and Disorder in its area", as clarified by PINS953.
- **The National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF)**

"Planning policies and decisions should aim to ensure that developments create: *Safe and accessible environments where crime and disorder, and the fear of crime, do not undermine quality of life or community cohesion.*"

Appendix 3: Crime Figures




The crime figures provided below are publicly available on the Internet at <http://www.met.police.uk/>. The figures can at best be considered as indicative as they do not include the wide variety of calls for police assistance which do not result in a crime report. Many of these calls involve incidents of anti-social behaviour and disorder both of which have a negative impact on quality of life issues.

Haringey is one of 32 London Boroughs policed by the Metropolitan Police Service. It currently has crime figures above average for the London Boroughs and suffers from high levels of crime and disorder to its residents and business communities.

The following figures relate to recorded crime data from Police.uk for the below area:



Noel Park ward



The most commonly reported crimes on this ward during September 2024 are: Shoplifting, Violence, Anti-Social behaviour and Theft. The crime levels over the last few months have rising. These crime types are also the most commonly reported crimes over the last 36 months.




Crime in Haringey compared with crime in similar areas

In the year ending June 2024, the crime rate in Haringey was about the same as the average crime rate across similar areas.

Edit crime type

All Crime

Update



The red and green lines show how far the crime rate would normally vary from the average. Haringey lies between the red and green lines, so its crime rate is normal for the group.

About this chart

This chart compares the crime rate in your local area to the average crime rate across similar areas. It shows the total number of crimes over a twelve month period per thousand residents, for the crime type selected.

Where your area lies in relation to the red and green lines is more important than its rank among similar areas. If your area lies between the red and green lines, its crime rate is normal for the group. If your area lies above the red line, its crime rate is higher than normal for the group, and similarly, if your area lies below the green line, its crime rate is lower than normal.

The areas shown in this chart are those that have been assessed to be most similar to your own. However, the circumstances within these areas do still vary and these variations can have an impact on the crime rates observed.

Source: ONS


Crime in Haringey compared with crime in other areas in the Metropolitan Police force area

In the year ending June 2024, the burglary rate in Haringey was higher than average for the Metropolitan Police area

Edit crime type

Burglary

Update



About this chart

This chart compares the crime rate in your local area to the average crime rate across the force area. It shows the total number of crimes over a twelve month period per thousand residents, for the crime type selected.

Source: ONS

Crime in Haringey compared with crime in other areas in the Metropolitan Police force area

In the year ending June 2024, the criminal damage and arson rate in Haringey was higher than average for the Metropolitan Police area

Edit crime type

Criminal damage and arson

Update



About this chart

This chart compares the crime rate in your local area to the average crime rate across the force area. It shows the total number of crimes over a twelve month period per thousand residents, for the crime type selected.

Source: ONS


Crime in Haringey compared with crime in other areas in the Metropolitan Police force area

In the year ending June 2024, the drug offence rate in Haringey was higher than average for the Metropolitan Police area

Edit crime type

Drugs

Update



About this chart

This chart compares the crime rate in your local area to the average crime rate across the force area. It shows the total number of crimes over a twelve month period per thousand residents, for the crime type selected.

Source: ONS

- **Police.Uk** provides open source crime data, please see the Home Office crime classifications below as depicted on the Police.uk web site keeping in mind that not all crime takes place in the public realm.

All crime: Total for all categories.

Anti-social behaviour: Includes personal, environmental and nuisance anti-social behaviour.

Bicycle theft: Includes the taking without consent or theft of a pedal cycle.

Burglary: Includes offences where a person enters a house or other building with the intention of stealing.

Criminal damage and arson: Includes damage to buildings and vehicles and deliberate damage by fire.

Drugs: Includes offences related to possession, supply and production.

Other crime: Includes forgery, perjury and other miscellaneous crime.

Other theft: Includes theft by an employee, blackmail and making off without payment.

Possession of weapons: Includes possession of a weapon, such as a firearm or knife.

Public order: Includes offences which cause fear, alarm or distress.

Robbery: Includes offences where a person uses force or threat of force to steal.

Shoplifting: Includes theft from shops or stalls.

Theft from the person: Includes crimes that involve theft directly from the victim (including handbag, wallet, cash, mobile phones) but without the use or threat of physical force.

Vehicle crime: Includes theft from or of a vehicle or interference with a vehicle.

Violence and sexual offences: Includes offences against the person such as common assaults, Grievous Bodily Harm and sexual offences.

This report gives recommendations. Please note that Crime Prevention Advice and the information in this report does not constitute legal or other professional advice; it is given free and without the intention of creating a contract or without the intention of accepting any legal responsibility. It is based on the information supplied and current crime trends in the area. All other applicable health, safety and fire regulations should be adhered to.

We strongly advise that independent third party certification is obtained from a manufacturer to ensure the fire performance of any of their door sets in relation to your needs and to ensure compliance with both current Building Regulations and the advice issued by the Department for Communities and Local Government on 22nd June 2017 following the Grenfell Tower Fire